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Abstract 
Experimental economics is used to investigate two important hypotheses proposed in the 
economics literature on tournaments.  Specifically, we test for a hypothesized “disincentives 
effect” which can occur in tournaments with mixed ability agents.  We also test the well known 
hypothesis that, when common shocks are an important source of risk, tournaments can filter out 
this common shock and reduce earnings risk to workers.  We find that disincentive effects arose 
in our tournament experiments, although these effects are not as strong as we predicted in our 
theoretical model and simulations.   We also find that tournaments can be very effective at 
reducing earnings variation when common shocks are important.  Taken together, these results 
suggest that the benefits of risk reduction from eliminating common shocks might outweigh the 
disincentive effects arising from mixed tournaments.  We also find that the difference in average 
earnings between low and high ability agents is greater under tournaments than under absolute 
performance contracts. 
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Mixed Tournaments, Common Shocks, and Disincentives: An Experimental Study 
Economists have devoted considerable attention to the study of alternative incentive schemes 
designed to motivate workers and align their interests with those of the firm.  In particular, 
tournament incentive schemes have received considerable attention in the literature because they 
are pervasive in the real world (Bull, Schotter and Weigelt 1987).  Under tournaments, workers 
are ranked against other workers and the level of their total pay depends on their relative ranking.   
Tournaments are often used to determine compensation for salespeople, executives, and for 
farmers raising broilers and tomatoes.  Moreover, political elections, promotions within firms, 
grading on curves in schools, and competition for positions in firms or sports teams can be 
interpreted as tournaments.   
Two important and well known predictions emerge from the economics literature on 
tournaments.  First, when there are common shocks that affect the performance of an entire 
cohort of workers/agents, then tournaments can be highly effective incentive devices.  Under 
tournaments, workers are ranked against other workers and the level of their total pay depends 
only on their relative ranking so that the impact of the common shock on pay is essentially 
filtered out.  Green and Stokey (1984) show theoretically that, in the absence of common shocks, 
absolute performance contracts Pareto-dominate tournaments but the reverse might be true when 
common shocks are important. 1   Second, there can be some disincentive effects from using 
tournaments when agents are of mixed ability (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Knoeber and Thurman 
1994).   Intuitively, when high ability agents compete against low ability agents, high ability 
agents can shirk and still win with high probability whereas low ability agents have a low 
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 Under absolute performance contracts, a worker’s performance is measured against some fixed standard(s) and 
total pay depends on whether performance meets or exceeds standard(s).  One can construct an absolute 
performance contract where attempting to meet or exceed standard(s) has similar incentive effects as trying to 
improve one’s rank under tournaments, although one’s ranking under tournaments also depends on how co-workers 
perform.   
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probability of winning even if they work hard.  Thus, neither agent has an incentive to work hard 
in equilibrium.   
Ironically, most experimental studies on tournaments (e.g. Bull, Schotter and Weigelt 
1987; Schotter and Weigelt 1992; Nalbantian and Schotter 1997; van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van 
Winden 2001) ignore common shocks which prevents inferences to be made about the ability of 
tournaments to reduce payment risks when common shocks are present.  Previous experimental 
studies do, however, examine tournaments with agents of mixed abilities (Bull, Schotter and 
Weigelt 1987; Schotter and Weigelt 1992; van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden 2001).  For the 
most part, low ability subjects in these studies tend to work as hard or harder than predicted 
under tournament theory.   This led van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden (p. 209) to suggest 
that “…theories which do not take into account factors such as a desire to outperform others 
irrespective of monetary gain, do not fare very well,” which implies that the disincentive effects 
of tournaments may be offset by other extrinsic psychological factors.  However, it is difficult to 
draw definite conclusions from these earlier studies as they were not designed to explicitly test 
for disincentive effects.   
In this study, we attempt to fill the research gaps left by earlier experimental studies by 
testing for the disincentive effect of mixed tournaments and the risk reducing properties of 
tournaments in the presence of common shocks.  It is important to empirically examine these 
aspects of tournaments because there is a possible tension between the positive effects of 
tournaments (reduce payment risk) and the disincentive effects from mixing agents in 
tournaments.  To understand this tension, note that tournaments are desirable theoretically 
because they can filter out the common shock which would reduce workers’ risk exposure.  A 
straightforward application of Holmstrom’s (1979) informativeness principle then suggests that 
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the firm can provide stronger incentives under tournaments relative to absolute performance 
contracts, thereby enabling firms to either implement higher effort or lower the cost of 
implementing a particular effort profile.2  This advantage of tournaments over absolute 
performance contracts increases with the importance of the common shock.  However, the 
wrench in the cog is that reducing risk means that high ability workers become more likely to 
win the tournament than low ability workers.  This is because when the relationship between 
performance and effort is noisy, low ability agents can still get lucky and win so low ability 
agents still have a reasonable probability of finishing ahead of the high ability agent.  However, 
as the common shock becomes more important (i.e. common shock variance increases), the 
tournament eliminates a higher proportion of total risk thereby significantly reducing the luck 
component.  Thus, when common shocks are important, the low ability agent is less likely to win 
the tournament, which increases the disincentive effect.  If this disincentive effect is strong 
enough, it is possible for absolute performance contracts to be preferred to tournaments in 
environments where the common shock is dominant!   
Lazear and Rosen suggest some mechanisms for mitigating the disincentive effects of 
mixed tournaments.  One possibility is that tournament organizers can screen potential 
employees to create a more homogeneous pool.  However, in practice, mixed pools may be 
unavoidable since there is typically a shortage of high ability workers to fill all positions so firms 
may be forced hire some lower ability workers to ensure that personnel needs are met.3   Lazear 
                                                 
2
 In an interesting twist, Hvide (2002) showed that workers may prefer more risk because it allows them to lower 
effort.  Thus, when their effort can influence the distribution of pay, then they take too much risk and exert too little 
effort. 
3
 For example, teams in Major League Baseball have adopted an extremely intensive sorting system to screen 
players.  A player who has reached the major leagues was most likely heavily evaluated by professional scouts since 
he was in high school.  From there, he may play college baseball followed by minor league baseball.  Only if the 
player survives minor league baseball, where competition is fierce, does the player ever reach the major leagues. 
Yet, despite this intense sorting process, there is substantial heterogeneity in major league talent.  One possible 
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and Rosen also suggest that handicapping tournaments to increase the competitiveness of less 
able players can also mitigate the disincentive effects of mixed tournaments.  However, 
handicapping is rarely feasible in most work places as they may be perceived to be unfair and 
high ability workers may threaten to quite.  Handicapping may, however, be feasible in some 
special settings, such as when firms are trying to fill desirable positions by either promoting from 
within or hiring externally (e.g. Chan 1996; Tsoulouhas, Knoeber, and Agrawal, forthcoming). 
Consequently, in most cases, complete and perfect sorting and the use of handicap schemes may 
not be feasible.  Thus, it is important to study the benefits and costs of using tournaments when 
agents/workers are of heterogeneous ability.    
An important aspect of our study is that we show through our modeling simulations that, 
as the common shock becomes more important (its variance increases), the probability of the 
high ability agent winning the tournament increases while the probability of the low ability agent 
decreases.  In the treatment where the common shock variance is highest, the low ability agent 
has such a low probability of winning that he/she is better off “quitting” by choosing zero effort.  
Thus, in contrast to previous studies, we designed an experimental treatment that allows us to 
explicitly test for the disincentive effects of mixed tournaments.  Moreover, by comparing 
payment variation across experiments with different common shock variances, we can assess 
whether tournaments reduce payment risk as predicted.  If tournaments induce both disincentives 
and a reduction in payment risk, then contract designers must carefully balance these two effects 
to obtain optimal tournament contracts in mixed ability environments.  Essentially, keeping 
agents exposed to a sufficient amount of payment risk would mitigate the disincentive effect.  
                                                                                                                                                             
explanation for this is that there is only a handful of elite players for each position so that many teams must make 
due with the “best that they’ve got” from their minor league system.    
 5 
Our results suggest that, in the treatment where the common shock variance is largest, 
disincentives do occur but not to the degree predicted by our theory and simulations.  In addition, 
in the same treatment, no disincentive effect was observed under the absolute performance 
contract so there appears to be some support for our theory, at least in a qualitative sense.  One 
possible explanation for why disincentive effects are not as strong as predicted is that some 
people may care about outperforming others, as suggested by van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van 
Winden, which can moderate the disincentive effect.  We also find that, under tournaments, 
earnings variability experienced by our subjects is decreasing in the variance of the common 
shock.  This is consistent with the prediction that tournaments are effective at reducing earnings 
risk in the presence of important common shocks.  Finally, a byproduct of our analysis is that we 
can make inferences about earnings inequality under tournaments and absolute performance 
contracts.  Our experimental results showed that the disparity in earnings between low ability 
and high ability subjects is greater under tournaments than under absolute performance contracts.  
This might be a concern to contract administrators who are worried about equity, morale issues, 
or social preferences (Kennedy 1995; Charness and Kuhn 2004; Bandiera, Barankay, Rasul 
2005).   In addition, Lazear (1989) suggests that earnings equality can possibly suppress 
uncooperative behavior when workers can affect each others output.   
I. Overview of the Experiments 
Prior to describing our theory and providing the details of our experiments, we will provide an 
overview of our experiments.  We conducted three experiments using undergraduate students at a 
major university in the Midwest.  For each experiment, we recruited twelve subjects via posters 
and email lists across a number of departments on campus.  These subjects arrived in a room and 
were randomly assigned to twelve chairs.  For tournament sessions, subjects were randomly 
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matched together to form pairs, but subjects were not informed of the personal identity of the 
other pair member.  Each subject was informed about whether her effort cost function is “high” 
or “low” and she knew that if she was a high cost subject (low ability subject), her pair member 
was a low cost subject (high ability subject) and vice versa.  Every subject was informed about 
her cost function as well as her pair member’s cost function so that all cost functions were 
common knowledge. 
Every subject was told that she can earn money by making good decisions during the 
experiments.  Each experiment contained four sessions of ten rounds each, where the first session 
of the night was a tournament session, followed by an absolute performance session.  After the 
first two sessions were completed, we conducted another tournament and another absolute 
performance session.  However, subjects did not gain automatic entry into the second half 
sessions; instead, they had to bid their way into these sessions through an auction using their 
experimental earnings from the first two sessions.  The sum of a subject’s bids could not exceed 
that subject’s accumulated earnings from the initial sessions.  The ten highest bidders for the 
tournament session got to participate in the post-auction tournament.  Similarly, the ten highest 
bidders for the absolute performance session got to participate in the additional absolute 
performance session.  To maximize subject take-home pay, we required that the ten highest 
bidders pay only the amount offered by the tenth place bidder.   Our auction design should, in 
principle, induce subjects to shade their bids below their true valuation so that subjects would not 
give up too much of their earnings.  Underbidding is not a problem for us because we are not 
interested in inducing truthful revelation; instead, we are interesting in inducing self sorting of 
subjects into the second half experiments, as we will discuss in the next paragraph.  This sorting 
requires only an ordinal ranking of bids, and since all subjects followed the same auction rules at 
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the same time and location, all subjects should underbid by the same amount thereby preserving 
ordinal rankings. 
The auction helped eliminate unmotivated subjects and also induced some sorting of 
subjects into the second half sessions based on motivation, preferences, beliefs and skills.  This 
type of sorting is a feature of competitive real world markets where certain types of people self 
select themselves into certain occupations and only remain in these occupations if they are 
sufficiently competent.  Indeed, the recent experimental literature has begun to tackle problems 
associated with sorting or self selection (e.g. Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber 2006).  Moreover, 
the repeated sessions helped to moderate learning effects.  By the time subjects reached the 
second half sessions, they had become “experienced” subjects, i.e., learning effects within these 
second half sessions should be minimal.  Thus, we expect the post-auction results to be relatively 
free of learning effects and contamination caused by non-self selection.   
Once all four sessions were completed, subjects filled out an exit questionnaire and were 
paid in cash for their performance for the evening.  In the next section, we discuss the underlying 
theory motivating our experiments and the experimental parameters employed. 
II. Theory, Experimental Parameters, and Predictions 
A. Theory 
The underlying theory motivating our experiments has been discussed in other papers on 
experimental tournaments (e.g. Bull, Schotter and Weigelt 1987 (BSW); and Schotter and 
Weigelt 1992 (SW)), and is motivated by the work of Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Green and 
Stokey (1984).  A key difference between our experiments and experiments from previous 
studies is that we include a common shock.  We provide a brief discussion of the theory in this 
section.   
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Consider a two-player tournament where each subject chooses a costly, non-contractible 
effort denoted by, ei, for i =1, 2.  Performance for subject i is stochastically related to effort via 
the production function: 
(1) yi = ei + uC + ui                               i =1, 2 
where yi is performance, uC is a common shock, and ui is an idiosyncratic shock that is 
independently and identically distributed across agents.  Random variables are distributed as 
follows: 2(0, )C Cu N σ ,  2(0, )iu N σ , ( , ) 0C iCov u u = , and ( , ) 0i jCov u u = , ∀ i ≠ j.  
 The tournament compensation rule is simple: if yi > yj, then player i receives a high 
payment denoted by R and player j receives a low payment, r, where R >r, and vice versa. 4  
Moreover, both agents face effort-cost functions satisfying: (0) 0c = , ( )ic e′ >0  and ( ) 0ic e′′ > . 
We also adopt the cost structure used by SW in their experiments, which is of the form, 
(2) 
2
( ) i ii i
e
c e
k
α
=  
where k > 0.  SW allowed for cost (ability) heterogeneity by letting iα  vary across agents.  We 
let 1.5iα =  for half the agents and 1jα =  for the other half - a high-cost agent is always matched 
with a low-cost agent.  
 Under tournaments, the probability of agent i receiving the high payment is 
Prob( i j j iu u e e− > − )  where ui – uj ~ N(0, 2σ2).  When common shock variance is the majority 
of total variance, then 2 2 22Cσ σ σ+ > and the total variance is lower under tournaments than 
under absolute performance contracts because 2Cσ  is eliminated under tournaments in exchange 
                                                 
4
 In the case of a tie, the high cost agent was declared the winner.  
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for the smaller 2σ  under absolute performance contracts.  If we let Prob( i j j iu u e e− > − ) = 1 - 
( )j iF e e−  where F(•) is the CDF of i ju u− , agent i’s objective function becomes, 
(3) 
2
( ) 1 ( ) ( )T i ii j i j i
eE F e e R F e e r
k
α
pi  = − − + − −   
which can be written as: 
(4) [ ]
2
( ) 1 ( )T i ii j i
eE r F e e R r
k
α
pi  = + − − − −   
Similarly, agent j’s objective function is: 
(5) [ ]
2
( ) ( ) j jTj j i
e
E r F e e R r
k
α
pi = + − − −  
The two agents essentially play a game where effort choices are strategies and earnings are given 
by (4) and (5).  First-order conditions are, 
(6) [ ]( ) 2( ) 0
T
i i i
j i
i
E ef e e R r
e k
pi α∂
= − − − =
∂
 
(7) [ ]( ) 2( ) 0
T
j j j
j i
j
E ef e e R r
e k
pi α∂
= − − − =
∂
 
where f(•) is the density function.  If cost functions were identical ( 1i jα α= = ), the solution is 
straightforward.  Conditions (6) and (7) suggest that, 
(8) [ ] 22 ( ) ji j i ee f e e R rk k= − − =  
so that ei = ej =e*  which is a symmetric Nash equilibrium.  It is clear that the density function 
f(•) will be evaluated at zero so that
2
1(0)
2 (2 )
f
pi σ
=  giving us, 
(9) [ ]
2
*
2 4
i j
k R r
e e e
piσ
−
= = =  
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However, our study features equilibrium effort levels that differ between high and low cost 
agents; hence, the normal distribution is not evaluated at 
2
1(0)
2 (2 )
f
pi σ
=  making the first 
order conditions much more difficult to solve.  We choose specific parameter values for our 
model (discussed in sub-section B) and use numerical methods to solve the first-order conditions.  
Like previous studies, we restrict subjects’ effort choices to be an integer from zero to 100; i.e. 
{0,1,...,100}ie ∈  
 Before we discuss parameters and equilibrium predictions, we briefly discuss the model 
used to motivate the absolute performance contract experiments.  Our absolute performance 
contract is similar to the tournament except agent i receives the high payment R if output exceeds 
a fixed standard y* and r otherwise.  The probability that agent i receives the high payment is 
Prob(yi > y*) = Prob(uC + ui > y* - ei), where uC + ui ~ N(0, 2 2Cσ σ+ ).  Letting G(•) be the CDF 
of uC + ui, we have Prob(uC + ui > y* - ei) = 1 - ( * )iG y e− .  Agent i’s objective function is, 
(10) [ ][ ]
2
( ) 1 ( * )F i ii i
eE r G y e R r
k
α
pi = + − − − −  
with a first-order condition of 
(11) [ ]( ) 2( * ) 0
F
i i i
i
i
E eg y e R r
e k
pi α∂
= − − − =
∂
 
Numerical methods are also used to solve (11).  In the next section, we discuss our choice of 
parameters to generate our solutions and predictions. 
B. Predictions 
So far, we have discussed our model and theory under the assumption that agents are risk-
neutral.  While Green and Stokey suggest that risk aversion is important for elevating the 
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importance of tournaments in the presence of common shocks, it would be extremely difficult to 
identify experimental subjects’ risk preferences.  Moreover, the type (e.g. CARA, CRRA, 
prospect theoretic preferences, etc.) and the level of risk aversion are likely to be heterogeneous 
across subjects so that there may be a plethora of possible equilibrium effort levels.  Thus, any 
risk preference structure we impose on subjects is likely to be no less arbitrary than assuming 
risk neutrality.  While we recognize the drawbacks from assuming risk neutrality, we maintain 
this assumption because it keeps the analysis manageable.  At the same time, risk neutral 
predictions are useful for heuristic purposes and deliver a useful starting point for generating 
qualitative hypotheses.   
We now discuss our process of choosing experimental parameters, which will determine 
our equilibrium predictions.  Like BSW, we choose our cost function parameter, k to be 10,000.  
We also assume that total variance, 2 2 500Cσ σ+ = , but we allow the ratio 
2
2
Cσ
σ
 to vary across 
experiments, which allows us to explore the effectiveness of tournaments at reducing payment 
variation in different common shock environments.  The columns in table 1 represent the 
different relative magnitudes of 2σ  and 2Cσ  in our three experiments.   
In choosing the payments R and r for the tournament, note that firms are typically 
interesting in inducing a specific level of effort from their workers, at least in the short run.  
Thus, they typically design an incentive scheme to implement an effort profile.  Implementing a 
particular effort profile involves choosing the spread between R and r to ensure incentive 
compatibility as dictated by equations (6), (7) (for tournaments) and (11) (for absolute 
performance contracts).   The choice of the level of r is used to determine expected earnings for 
the agents.  The average effort level we try to implement is * 37e = as this did not appear to be an 
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obvious number that subjects spuriously might choose, thereby biasing the results.  We therefore 
had to choose the spread R – r to implement an effort level of 37, on average.  Because the effort 
cost functions differed across agents within a pair, high and low cost agents had different Nash 
equilibrium effort levels, but the average of the two was 37.  The low payment r was used to 
determine the ex ante earnings for agents.  For each experiment, we chose r to ensure that high 
cost agents receive expected earnings of $14.20 and low cost agents receive expected earnings of 
$23.50 for an average of $18.90.  $19 is about the going rate for a two-hour student experiment 
on the host campus.  Each experiment consisted of four ten-round sessions for a total of forty 
rounds of play.  Thus, the per-round expected earnings for the high cost and low costs agents 
were $0.36 and $0.59, respectively, for an average of approximately $0.47.5  
 Once the targeted effort levels and expected earnings were identified, we pin down 
optimal values of R and r (see row 1, table 1).  Using experiment 2 as an example, with a 
common shock variance of 2 250Cσ = , the optimal payment spread is 0.62R r− = .  In principle, 
this spread should induce high cost subjects to choose e = 30 and low cost subjects to choose e = 
44 for an average of e = 37 (see row 2, table 1).  To pin down r, numeric simulations showed 
that r = 0.33 would provide high and low cost agents with per round expected earnings of 
approximately $0.36 and $0.59, respectively (see row 4, table 1).6  Parameters for the other 
experiments, where we varied the relative sizes of the common and idiosyncratic shocks, were 
generated in a similar fashion.    
In calibrating parameters for the absolute performance contract, we wanted the average 
effort level to be 37 as under the tournaments.  This allowed us to study how absolute 
                                                 
5
 Although there are some minor rounding errors.  
6
 We say “approximately” because our numerical calculations had minor rounding errors.  For example, effort for a 
high cost agent was actually 29.98 for an idiosyncratic variance of 250 and a pay spread of 0.62. The expected 
earnings were also slightly different from $0.36 and $0.59 due to minor approximation errors.   
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performance contracts were relative to tournaments in achieving the same performance 
objectives.  Second, we wanted to maintain the same expected earnings for the agents, which is 
to say that the firm would have to satisfy the same participation contracts under both contracts.    
 Note that the incentive compatibility constraint for the agent is given by (11) so that if we 
wanted an average effort level of e = 37, we can solve for the payment spread that would induce 
this average effort level.7  However, we had to first choose a fixed standard y*, which output 
must exceed in order for the agent to receive the high payment R.  An obvious choice was y* = 
37, but we avoided this choice because we did not want to provide our subjects with a focal point 
so that they might naturally gravitate toward a solution of 37.  Instead, we chose y* = 41 and 
then adjusted our payment spread to ensure that 37 was the optimal choice.  Our numeric 
simulations yielded an optimal wage spread of R – r = 0.55 (row 1, table 1).  While this spread 
produced an average of e = 37, we note that the high cost agents optimal effort is e = 27 while 
the optimal low cost effort is e = 47 (row 2).  Additionally, the value of r that would result in 
average expected earnings of $0.47 per round to satisfy the “participation constraint” was r = 
0.40 (row 1).  However, while this value of r is consistent with an expected per round earnings 
approximately $0.47 when we pool all the agents, the expected per round earnings for the high 
and low cost agents are $0.44 and $0.51, respectively.  Hence, the gap in expected earnings 
between high and low cost agents is lower under the absolute performance contract so that we 
might expect greater inequality under tournaments.      
C. Additional Details of the Experiments 
We now provide additional details concerning the implementation of our experiments using 
experiment 2 as an example.  For this experiment, each agent’s output is the sum of an effort 
                                                 
7
 We also evaluated the second order conditions to ensure that we are at a maximum. 
 14 
integer from 0 to 100, an idiosyncratic shock, ui , distributed ui ~ N(0, 250), and an aggregate 
shock, uC, distributed uC ~ N(0, 250), to get i i C iy e u u= + + .  The output for agent j is similarly 
defined.  We approximated a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 250 using 300 
pennies in a bucket where each penny was marked with an outcome for the random shocks.  The 
outcomes were represented by integers and the frequency for each outcome was determined by 
approximating the number of outcomes out of 300 that might occur under a normal distribution.8  
Distributions for other values of 2Cσ  and σ
2
 (i.e. for experiments 1 and 3) were approximated 
using the same method.  For tournament sessions, if i jy y> , then agent i gets R = 0.95 and agent 
j gets r =0.33,  and if i jy y< , then agent i gets r =0.33 and agent j gets 0.95.  This rule applied 
for experiments 1 and 3 as well, except that the numeric values of R and r were different.  Each 
low cost subject was matched with a high cost subject in a tournament round and both players 
were informed about both her cost function and her opponent’s cost function.  The absolute 
performance sessions were similar to the tournament sessions, except that each subject played 
against a fixed standard of y* = 41, rather than against a pair member.   
 In each session, subjects play ten identical rounds of the game.  In each round subjects 
choose “decision numbers” (effort) from 0 to 100 and enter the decision numbers into 
individually maintained worksheets as an experimenter records the decisions in a computer.  
Then one subject draws a “common shock” number from a bucket with frequencies that 
approximated a normal distribution and all subjects add this number to their decision numbers.  
Next, each subject draws a number from another bucket with frequencies approximating another 
normal distribution, and then this individual number was added to the decision number and the 
                                                 
8
 The exact method that we used was to calculate the probability mass function in Excel for a normal distribution 
with mean zero, and standard deviation 15.8.  We then multiplied the probability for each outcome by 300 and 
rounded it to the nearest integer.  The resulting integer represented the frequency for that particular outcome.   
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common shock number.  Copies of the probability distributions for both the idiosyncratic and 
common shocks were given to subjects prior to the beginning of the experiment and explained in 
detail so these distributions were common knowledge.  The sum of the decision number, the 
common shock, and the idiosyncratic shock is “performance” (yi).   
 In tournament sessions, the administrator would compare outputs of pair members and 
inform all subjects of the relevant payment received for the round (R or r).  Each subject is told 
only his/her own payment and not the difference in output.9  For absolute performance sessions, 
output is compared to the fixed standard of 41.  Each subject records the payment in the 
worksheet and subtracts the decision cost to get net earnings for that round.  This pattern is 
identically repeated in all 10 rounds.  At the end of the tenth round, subjects calculated 
cumulative earnings for the ten rounds and confirmed these figures with the computer 
maintained records kept by the administrator.10   
 All subjects received cost sheets that mimicked their cost functions, knew the 
distribution of the numbers in the buckets, and were informed of all other experimental 
parameters, including opponents’ cost functions.  Only the personal identity of the pair members 
was not common knowledge.  A session typically lasted between 20-25 minutes; two non-
paying, practice rounds were played before each session to ensure that subjects understood the 
experiment.  Complete instructions for the experiments are in the appendix. 
A potential criticism of our experimental design is that the order of our sessions is not 
counterbalanced; that is, the tournament is always conducted first and could give rise to order 
                                                 
9
 This is consistent with the way many comparative performance contracts work where workers are informed about 
their rankings but are not provided detailed information about competitors’ performance.  
10
 While the tournament was repeated over 10 rounds, the theory is based on a static model.  Such repetition is 
common in experimental practice because subjects make complex decisions.  Moreover, the only subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium to a finitely repeated game involves the choice of the Nash equilibrium decision level to the one-
shot game.  Thus, predictions concerning equilibrium play were independent of finite repetition (BSW).   
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effects.  This was done to minimize the potential for subjects to use the fixed standard of 41 as a 
focal point for choosing strategies in a tournament setting.  Moreover, this issue is not as 
problematic as it might be in some experiments because we will primarily focus on the data for 
both contract types after the auction.  
III. Analysis and Results 
A. Hypotheses 
Prior to analyzing our results, we state the primary hypotheses that we are interested in for this 
study.  First, our simulations predict that the probability of “winning,” (i.e. receiving the high 
payment R) for high cost subjects decreases as 2Cσ  increases and the opposite is true for low cost 
subjects.  In fact, one can see from experiment 3, where 2Cσ  is largest, that the probability of the 
high cost subject winning is only 20% (table 1).  Note in particular that, if the high cost subject 
“quits” and exerts no effort, she still has an 8% (in parentheses) chance of winning, which is only 
12% lower than exerting the equilibrium effort of 30 and much less costly.  This means that the 
expected earnings to the high cost agent from exerting no effort is $0.40 (in parentheses) per 
round whereas it is only $0.33 if equilibrium effort is exerted.  If the high cost agent quits, then 
the optimal response of the low cost agent is to exert an effort level of 24 (in parentheses), which 
is far below the equilibrium effort of 44.  Thus, a disincentive effect is created for both subjects.  
Experiment 3 provides us with a treatment that allows us to explicitly test for disincentives of 
mixed tournaments. 
Hypothesis 1A: When the common shock is important enough (i.e. 2 350Cσ = ), then the 
tournament induces a disincentive effect.  Specifically, effort for both types of subjects will be 
lower in experiment 3 ( 2 350Cσ = ) than in experiments 1 and 2 ( 2 150 / 250Cσ = ).    
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Hypothesis 1B:  Since the absolute performance contract does not eliminate the common shock, 
effort should remain invariant to increases in the relative size of 2Cσ ; i.e. no disincentives effects 
will occur.   
Another prediction from our simulations is that the variance in earnings under 
tournaments decrease as 2Cσ  increases (see table 1), which is consistent with the well known 
result that tournaments can reduce earnings risk by filtering out the common shock.  Predicted 
earnings variance under tournaments is larger than earnings variance under absolute performance 
contracts when 2Cσ  is small to medium (experiments 1 and 2), but the reverse is true when 2Cσ  is 
large.  Note that this prediction is not affected by potential disincentive effects in experiment 3 as 
earnings variance is lowest in experiment 3 regardless of whether subjects play the non-
disincentive equilibrium or the disincentive equilibrium.   
Hypothesis 2A:  Under tournaments, the variance of earnings to subjects should be decreasing 
with 2Cσ . 
Hypothesis 2B:  Under absolute performance contracts, the variance of earnings to subjects 
should be invariant to 2Cσ . 
If we take earnings variance is an approximation of risk, then clearly the tournament is 
more effective at reducing earnings risk when common shocks are important.  Thus, if subjects 
are risk averse, the principal should be able to either provide stronger incentives under 
tournaments (relative to absolute performance contracts) or reduce the wage costs of 
implementing a specific effort profile.11  Of course, in principle, risk averse agents may care 
                                                 
11
 Note that our pay spreads, R - r were determined under the assumption of risk neutrality.  If agents are risk averse, 
then the pay spreads reported in table 1 would be too large and should be reduced if the principal is behaving 
optimally.  Nonetheless, the contract that induces lower earnings risk would require a smaller reduction in the 
spread; i.e. stronger incentives can be maintained under the less risky contract when agents are risk averse. 
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about the entire distribution of earnings and not just the first two moments.  Consequently, using 
only the variance (or standard deviation) of earnings as a measure of risk is exactly true only 
under certain assumptions, such as when the utility function is quadratic or if earnings are 
normally distributed.  Nonetheless, in the absence of other information about subjects’ risk 
preferences, we use variance is a manageable approximation of risk.12 
A byproduct of our experimental design is that we can examine questions concerning pay 
inequality across tournaments and absolute performance contracts.  
Hypothesis 3: The difference in earnings between low cost agents and high cost agents is greater 
under tournaments than under absolute performance contracts.  
While earnings inequality is not the main focus of this study, our simulations and 
experiments do allow us to easily test whether inequality is greater under tournaments or 
absolute performance contracts.  The literature on compensation schemes suggests that earnings 
equality is desirable to suppress uncooperative behavior when workers can affect each others 
output (Lazear 1989); to increase morale (Kennedy 1995); or for fairness reasons (Charness and 
Kuhn 2004).  Thus, understanding what type of contract is likely to induce greater earnings 
inequality, holding productivity constant, might be of interest to scholars studying pay-equity 
issues.  Our simulations suggest that earnings per round for low cost agents would be higher 
under tournaments rather than under absolute performance contracts (see table 1) so that high 
ability agents may prefer a competitive scheme.  Low cost subjects are expected to earn $0.59 
per round (or $0.80 under disincentive effects in experiment 3) under tournaments, but only 
$0.51 per round under absolute performance contracts.  High cost subjects are expected to earn 
more under absolute performance ($0.44) contracts than under tournaments ($0.36).  This 
                                                 
12
 In practice, the standard deviation of earnings is frequently invoked to capture risk in finance.  Moreover, a 
normal distribution may be able to approximate the binomially distributed earnings of our subjects since they play a 
sequence of independent rounds. 
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suggests that the expected earnings gap between low and high cost subjects is larger under the 
tournament scheme. 
B. Actual versus Predicted Effort 
We begin our analysis by comparing subject effort to predicted levels.  Because predicted effort 
levels are generated under the assumption of risk neutrality, we would not be surprised if actual 
effort differed from predicted effort.  Nonetheless, if subjects choose effort levels that do not 
deviate on an order of magnitude that is large relative to other experimental studies, it may 
inspire more confidence in our experimental design.  
We begin by examining summary statistics for pooled effort levels in table 2.  Note that 
we partition the data into pre- and post-auction sessions for both types of contracts so that we can 
see how learning effects and sorting of subjects may have affected the results.   
 For data combined from all three experiments (row 1, table 2), we find average effort 
under tournaments is 46.7 in pre-auction sessions and a remarkable 37.5 in post auction sessions, 
which is not significantly different from predicted effort levels using a Wilcoxon Sign-Rank test.  
The difference between pre- and post-auction results is also significant at the 5% level, 
suggesting that learning effects and sorting may matter.   
The next three rows of table 2 partition the data across experiments with different size 
common shock variances, though, as discussed earlier, contract parameters are adjusted to ensure 
the same optimal effort and earnings across experiments.  Thus, we should observe the same 
average effort across experiments.  However, there was noticeable variation in average effort 
across tournament experiments and all but one of the experiments ( 2 150Cσ = , post-auction) 
yielded average effort that was significantly different from predicted levels.  Note also that pre- 
and post-auction effort were significantly different in two of the three experiments.    
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Pooled average effort under absolute performance contracts was slightly above the 
simulated optimal effort of 37 for pre-auction (43.2) and post-auction (41.8) data.  While average 
effort did vary across experiments, the variation was not as great in the post-auction data, 
ranging from a low of 39.8 ( 2 350Cσ = ) to a high of 44 ( 2 250Cσ = ).  Moreover, there appears to 
be less disparity between pre- and post-auction results under absolute performance contracts 
compared to tournaments, which is not surprising as subjects solve a simpler optimization 
problem and may learn more quickly. 
 Table 2 also lists summary statistics for low cost and high cost agents.  Several points are 
worth highlighting.  First, when the common shock is the largest ( 2 350Cσ = ), post-auction effort 
under tournaments is lower than in the other two experiments, which is indicative of some 
disincentive effects.  On the other hand, average effort for both cost types is higher than that 
predicted at the disincentive equilibrium.  High cost subjects should exert zero effort, but the 
average was 24 (significantly different from zero at the 1% level), while low cost subjects should 
exert 24, but the average was 34.1 (significantly different from 24 at the 1% level).   
Second, in the majority of cases under tournaments, pre- and post-auction effort levels 
differed significantly at the 5% level for both cost types.  Performance under absolute 
performance contracts appears to be more robust to learning effects and sorting.  Given the 
disparity between pre- and post-auction results for tournaments, whenever pre- and post-auction 
results conflict, we will give preference to post-auction results.    
Third, focusing on the post-auction data, high cost subjects appear to play the predicted 
tournament equilibrium strategies, on average, with the exception of the experiment where 
2 350Cσ = .  In this experiment, average effort is significantly different from the equilibrium 
strategy at the 10% level and from the disincentive equilibrium of zero effort at the 1% level.  
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With regard to absolute performance contracts, in the majority of cases, subjects of both cost 
types deviate from predicted optimal effort.   
How did our experimental results align with simulated outcomes compared to other 
experimental studies on tournaments?  Focusing on the post-auction data, the worst performing 
outcomes relative to predictions is for low cost subjects in the 2 250Cσ =  experiment.  Low cost 
subjects exert mean effort of 57.8 whereas the prediction is 44 for a gap of 13.8.  Compared to 
the BSW experiments, which were similar to ours in design, these deviations from predicted 
effort were reasonable – some of the BSW effort outcomes, which are measured in the same 
units, deviated by as much as 22 effort units.      
Because subjects played multiple rounds in each session, it would be interesting to 
examine behavioral patterns across rounds.  Figure 1 graphs the evolution of average effort for 
the 2 150Cσ =  and 
2 250Cσ =  experiments (pooled together) and figure 2 graphs the evolution of 
effort for the 2 350Cσ =  experiment.  We constructed a separate graph for the 
2 350Cσ =  
experiment because it has a possible disincentive equilibrium, as well as a regular equilibrium.  
We graph separate paths for each cost type and for pre- and post-auction experiments.  Figure 1 
shows that average effort in the post-auction sessions is closer to equilibrium predictions for both 
cost types.  For high cost types in particular, average post-auction effort tends to hover around 
the equilibrium effort of 30 in most rounds, suggesting that either sorting or learning effects 
improve subjects’ strategies.  Low cost subjects typically work harder than predicted but in the 
post-auction sessions average effort is closer to the equilibrium prediction of 44. 
Figure 2 presents a similar graph for the 2 350Cσ =  experiment, which is characterized by 
greater variation across rounds for both subject types.  The greater variation may stem from 
reliance on less data (relative to figure 1) and because there are two possible equilibria in this 
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treatment.  One discernable pattern is that average effort tends to be lower for both cost types in 
the post-auction experiment.  In fact, for low cost types, average effort even approaches the 
disincentive equilibrium of 24 by round 9 of the post-auction session.  The same cannot be said 
for high cost types who, as a group, do not appear to ever approach the disincentive equilibrium 
of 0 effort.   
Figure 3 graphs the evolution of average effort under absolute performance contracts for 
all experiments.  For low cost subjects, the pattern of evolution for pre- and post auction data 
appears to be similar except for the last round where post-auction averages fall below the 
predicted level of effort.  There appears to be slightly more divergence between pre- and post-
auction results for high cost subjects.  While subjects collectively exert higher effort than 
predicted, the post-auction outcomes are closer to the predicted effort level of 27.   
Overall, our subjects appear to collectively choose effort levels that do not deviate far 
from predicted effort levels.  This is true for both tournaments and absolute performance 
sessions, which lends confidence in our experimental design.  However, pre-auction results 
appear to be further from predicted effort levels, especially for tournaments.  It’s possible that 
the combination of sorting induced by the auction and the moderation of learning effects helped 
subjects improve their strategies in the post-auction sessions.  As such, most of our analysis from 
this point forward will focus on post-auction results. 
C. Analysis of Disincentive Effects 
In this section, we will formally test hypotheses 1A and 1B, which are predictions about the 
disincentive effects of tournaments.  The two hypotheses essentially state that disincentive 
effects should occur under tournaments but not under absolute performance contracts when the 
variance of the common shock is large enough.   
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 Figure 4 examines the pattern of average pooled effort (average of high and low cost 
subjects) across rounds.  We pooled the data rather than examine average effort of each cost type 
separately because disincentive effects are expected to occur for both types.  The figure indicates 
a possibility of disincentive effects as average effort for the 2 350Cσ =  experiment is lower than 
the average effort for the 2 150 / 250Cσ =  across all rounds.  A Mann-Whitney test confirms that 
this difference is statistically significant (p-value = 0.00).   
Because subjects played multiple rounds in each session, we had many repeated 
observations by subject.  Hence, across-round observations will not be a part of a random 
sample, but it does allow us to use panel methods to control for unobservable heterogeneity, such 
as rate of learning, risk tolerances, among other factors, which may affect subjects’ effort 
choices.  We ran a random effects regression (with robust standard errors) where the dependent 
variable is effort, and the explanatory variables were an experiment 3 dummy, which equals “1” 
if the observation came from the 2 350Cσ =  experiment and “0” otherwise, and a “period” 
variable to control for time trends.  Only the post-auction data was used as we deemed this data 
to be more reliable. 
The results of the regression using the tournaments data are reported in column (1) of 
table 1.   Note that, under hypothesis 1A, the coefficient for the experiment 3 dummy should be 
negative and significant, and indeed, the estimated coefficient is -12.61 and significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level of significance.  While this suggests that the conditional 
mean of effort is approximately 12.61 lower under experiment 3 than the other experiments, 
which is suggestive of a disincentive effect, the evidence does not appear to be overwhelming for 
several reasons.  First, the coefficient is only significantly different from zero at the 10% level.  
Second, while effort is lower in experiment 3, both types of subjects appear to work harder than 
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predicted under the disincentive effects equilibrium.  For example, under the disincentive 
equilibrium, high cost types should quit and exert zero effort, which should also drag down the 
average effort of low cost subjects, who are predicted to exert effort of 24.  Thus, pooled effort 
should be 12, which is 25 units lower than the non-disincentive pooled effort of 37.  Hence, we 
would expect the coefficient for the experiment 3 dummy to be -25, which is about twice is large 
in absolute value as our estimated coefficient of -12.61.  Also, according to table 2 (last row), 
high cost subjects “quit” in only 22% of all trades, and average effort is 24, which is almost as 
high as what is predicted in the non-disincentive equilibrium.   We therefore conclude that while 
there is some evidence of disincentives from mixed tournaments, one should not discount the 
statement by van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden that people are motivated by non-monetary 
factors such as the desire to outperform others.   
To test hypothesis 1B, we ran the same regression using only the post-auction absolute 
performance data – results are reported in column 2 of table 1.  Note that the estimated 
coefficient for experiment 3 is not significantly different from zero (p-value was 0.65) so there is 
no evidence of a disincentive effect under the absolute performance contract.  This result is 
consistent with hypothesis 1B.   
To summarize, we find some evidence of disincentive effects under tournaments but not 
absolute performance contracts, which is qualitatively consistent with our theory and hypotheses.  
However, the results should be interpreted with caution as the disincentive effect under 
tournaments was only significant at the 10% level and the magnitude of the disincentive effect is 
smaller than predicted. 
D. Earnings Risk 
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Hypotheses 2A and 2B are statements about the variance in earnings under the two contracts.  As 
mentioned earlier, we do not have information about subjects’ risk preferences so we use 
earnings variance as a manageable proxy of risk.  It is well known from the tournaments 
literature that one of the benefits of tournaments is that they eliminate common shocks and 
therefore can reduce earnings risk exposure to agents.  This can benefit the contract administrator 
because higher powered incentives can be provided to agents when risk is reduced.   
Table 4 provides summary statistics for earnings per round along with earnings standard 
deviations in parentheses using the post-auction data.  Focusing on the pooled data in the first 
four rows, it appears that the standard deviation of earnings decreases under tournaments as 2Cσ  
increases.  When 2Cσ =150, the standard deviation is $0.32, which drops to $0.28 for 2Cσ =250, 
and finally down to $0.26 when 2Cσ =350.   
To formally test the hypothesis, we ran a random effects regression where the dependent 
variable is earnings deviation from means, which is defined as, 
(12) ( )2ikE kED pi pi= −    
where k is an index for the contract type (tournament or absolute performance), E is an index for 
the experiment ( 2Cσ  = 150, 250, or 350), and i is an index for the ith observation from experiment 
E under contract k.  The independent variables are a tournament dummy which equals “1” if the 
observation is from a tournament session and “0” otherwise; a variable for the standard deviation 
of the common shock (σC) which can take three values, 12.2, 15.8, and 18.7; an interaction term 
tournament × σC; and a period time trend variable.  The results of the regression using the post-
auction data are reported in column (1) of table 5. 
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 Testing hypotheses 2A and 2B requires an examination of the incremental impact of Cσ  
on the dependent variable, D.  Note that the incremental impact of Cσ  on D under absolute 
performance contracts is given by the coefficient for Cσ , which, by hypothesis 2B, should not be 
significantly different from zero.  Indeed, the estimated coefficient is -0.003 and it is not 
significantly different from zero.  Thus, we cannot reject hypothesis 2B.  Testing hypothesis 2A 
involves looking at the sum of the coefficients for Cσ  and the interaction term tournament × σC.  
The hypothesis predicts that this sum should be negative – that is, deviations should decrease 
with Cσ  under tournaments.  Indeed, the sum of the coefficients is negative (-0.01) and 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  Thus, our statistical results are qualitatively 
consistent with hypotheses 2A and 2B, which implies that, as common shocks become more 
important, tournaments can reduce earnings deviations. 
E. Pay Inequality 
An important issue that may concern contract administrators is how the distribution of earnings 
to workers will be affected by the choice of payment scheme.  Hypothesis 3 states that 
tournaments will induce a greater pay gap between low cost and high cost subjects than absolute 
performance contracts would.  Recall that our simulations predict that low cost subjects would 
earn around $0.59 per round (see table 1) under tournaments contracts and $0.51 per round under 
absolute performance contracts.  At the same time, high cost subjects are predicted to earn $0.36 
per round under tournaments and $0.44 under absolute performance contracts.  This suggests that 
the expected pay difference is greater under tournaments.   
In table 4, we see that, for the post-auction data across all experiments, low cost subjects 
did indeed earn more under tournaments than absolute performance contracts as predicted by the 
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simulations.  The difference in earnings ($0.54- $0.46 = $0.08) was very close to the difference 
predicted in the simulations ($0.59-$0.51 =$0.08).  With regard to high cost subjects, our 
simulations predict that they would earn $0.36 per round under tournaments and $0.44 under 
absolute performance contracts.  Scanning table 4, subjects seem to earn less than what was 
predicted as the overall post-auction earnings were $0.29 and $0.41 under tournaments and 
absolute performance contracts, respectively.  The difference in earnings ($0.41 - $0.29 = $0.12) 
appears to be slightly larger than the predicted difference ($0.44 - $0.36 = $0.08).  Nonetheless, 
the empirical results are close enough to the predictions of the simulations that we feel that the 
theory performed adequately. 
 We now turn to a formal test of hypotheses 3 using regression results.  The regression we 
run has earnings per round as the dependent variable.  The independent variables are a 
tournament dummy, the common shock standard deviation, Cσ , a low cost dummy which takes 
the value of “1” if the observation is from a low cost subject and “0” otherwise, an interaction 
term between the tournament dummy and σC, an interaction term between the tournament 
dummy and low cost dummy, and a period time trend variable.  The regression results are 
reported in column (2) of table 5.     
Hypothesis 3, which states that the earnings gap between low and high-cost subjects is 
greater under tournaments than under absolute performance contracts can be tested with the 
above regression.  Because the low cost agents are predicted to earn more under both types of 
contracts, we expect the low cost dummy coefficient to be positive and significant.  Under 
hypothesis 3, this earnings disparity is expected to increase even more under tournaments so we 
expect the low cost × tournament interaction coefficient to be positive and significantly different 
from zero.  The results show that this interaction coefficient is positive (0.19) and significantly 
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different from zero at the 1% level of confidence.  Hence, our results are consistent with 
hypothesis 3, which suggests that tournaments implement greater earnings inequality.     
With regard to the magnitudes of our estimates, the coefficient for the low cost dummy is 
0.07 (significant at the 10% level), which is the difference in pay between high and low cost 
agents under absolute performance contracts.  This equals the predicted gap of 0.07.  The 
estimated gap under tournaments is simply the sum of the low cost coefficient and the lowcost × 
T interaction coefficient, which is estimated to be 0.26 and significantly different from zero at 
1%.  This is fairly close to the predicted gap of 0.23.  Consequently, our numeric model does a 
remarkable job of predicting actual earnings outcomes.   
IV. Conclusion 
In this paper, we discuss the results of an experimental study that investigates two important 
hypotheses proposed in the literature on tournaments with agents of mixed ability.  Specifically, 
we test for a hypothesized “disincentives effect” which can occur in tournaments with mixed 
ability agents.  We also test the well known hypothesis that, when common shocks are an 
important source of risk, tournaments can filter out this common shock and reduce earnings risk 
to workers.  This would allow contract administrators to implement stronger incentives and 
possibly increase productivity.  To our knowledge, these hypotheses have not been explicitly 
tested in the literature.   
Understanding whether mixed tournaments trigger disincentives and/or reduce risk is 
important because there is a potential tradeoff between risk reduction and disincentives; i.e. 
greater risk reduction may trigger stronger disincentives.  To understand this tradeoff, note that 
disincentives are possible in tournaments if low ability agents “give-up” and high ability agents 
shirk because they know they will win no matter what.  One way to mitigate this disincentive 
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effect is to increase the amount of risk faced by workers.  Intuitively, if the relationship between 
effort and performance is noisy, then low ability workers have a better chance of getting “lucky” 
and winning the tournament which would restore incentives for low ability agents to try hard and 
for high ability agents to exert effort to reduce the odds of losing due to bad luck.  Thus, if mixed 
tournaments induce significant disincentives, then we may arrive at the counterintuitive 
conclusion that tournaments are less desirable when common shocks are important. 
 Our primary findings are that disincentive effects arose in our tournament experiments, 
although these effects are not as strong as we predicted in our theoretical model and subsequent 
simulations.  It appears that many low ability subjects worked hard even when they had clear 
monetary incentives not to.  We also find that tournaments can be very effective at reducing 
earnings variation when common shocks are important.  Taken together, these results suggest 
that the benefits of risk reduction from eliminating common shocks might outweigh the 
disincentive effects of reducing risk.  Thus, mixed tournaments might still be adequate incentive 
mechanisms in environments with significant common shocks.  One possible direction of future 
research is to determine why low ability subjects continue to work hard even when they can earn 
more by quitting.  Perhaps behavioral explanations can be used to explain this phenomenon.  
Another direction for future research would be to develop tournament models that formalize the 
tradeoff between risk reduction and disincentives to add more clarity to the problem. 
A byproduct of our experimental design is that we are able to test whether greater 
earnings inequality occurs under tournaments relative to absolute performance contracts.   We 
found that there was greater inequality in earnings under tournaments so that a switch to absolute 
performance contracts may result in a more equal earnings distribution across heterogeneous 
workers.  If equity or morale issues are important in a firm, or if equity can mitigate 
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uncooperative behavior, as suggested by Lazear (1989), then there are additional downsides to 
using tournaments.  
 
 
.  
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Table 1.  Parameters, Simulations and Predictions 
 Experiment 1 
2
Cσ =150 
2σ =350 
Experiment 2 
2
Cσ =250 
2σ =250 
Experiment 3 
2
Cσ =350 
2σ =150 
 Tournament Absolute 
Standard 
Tournament Absolute 
Standard 
Tournament1 Absolute 
Standard 
Optimal Payments per 
Round 
            R 
            r 
 
 
$0.99 
$0.29 
 
 
$0.95 
$0.40 
 
 
$0.95 
$0.33 
 
 
$0.95 
$0.40 
 
 
$0.90 
$0.35 
 
 
$0.95 
$0.40 
Effort Implemented 
      High Cost Agent 
      Low Cost Agent 
      Average 
 
30 
44 
37 
 
 
27 
47 
37 
 
30 
44 
37 
 
27 
47 
37 
 
30 (0) 
44 (24) 
37 (12) 
 
27 
47 
37 
Winning Probability 
      High Cost Agent 
      Low Cost Agent 
 
0.29 
0.71 
 
0.26 
0.61 
 
0.25 
0.75 
 
0.26 
0.61 
 
0.20 (0.08) 
0.80 (0.92) 
 
0.26 
0.61 
Ex. Earnings per Round 
      High Cost Agent 
      Low Cost Agent 
      Average 
 
$0.36 
$0.59 
$0.47 
 
$0.44 
$0.51 
$0.47 
 
$0.36 
$0.59 
$0.47 
 
$0.44 
$0.51 
$0.47 
 
$0.33 ($0.40) 
$0.59 ($0.80) 
$0.47 ($0.60) 
 
$0.44 
$0.51 
$0.47 
Variance of Earnings  
      High Cost Agent 
      Low Cost Agent 
      Average 
 
$0.10 
$0.10 
$0.10 
 
$0.058 
$0.072 
$0.065 
 
$0.070 
$0.070 
$0.070 
 
$0.058 
$0.072 
$0.065 
 
$0.048($0.023) 
$0.048($0.023) 
$0.048($0.023) 
 
$0.058 
$0.072 
$0.065 
 
Firm’s Expected Wage 
Cost Per Worker Per 
Round 
 
 
$0.64 
 
 
$0.64 
 
 
$0.64 
 
 
$0.64 
 
 
$0.63 ($0.63) 
 
 
$0.64 
1Numbers in parentheses in this column represents outcomes if the high cost agent chooses the 
corner solution and exerts zero effort. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Effort Levels – Means (Standard Deviations) 
 Pre-Auction Post-Auction 
 Tournament Absolute 
Performance 
Tournament Absolute 
Performance 
Pooled Effort     
    All experiments 
 
46.7*** 
(21.8) 
 
43.2*** 
(17.6) 
37.5 
(21.4) 
41.8*** 
(16.4) 
   σc=150 exp. 
 
          
39.9** 
(18.4) 
 
39.3** 
(18.2) 
37.2 
(18.3) 
41.5*** 
(13.8) 
   σc=250 exp. 
 
56.8*** 
(16.8) 
 
48.6*** 
(18.5) 
46.2*** 
(20.1) 
44*** 
(18.4) 
   σc=350 exp. 43.3*** 
(25.5) 
41.9*** 
(14.5) 
29.09*** 
(21.6) 
39.8*** 
(16.4) 
     
Low Cost Effort     
    All experiments 
 
54.1*** 
(19.3) 
 
51.3*** 
(13.5) 
45.9** 
(19.3) 
49.7*** 
(12.6) 
   σc=150 exp. 
 
48.3** 
(16.3) 
 
50.4** 
(11.3) 
45.7 
(13.2) 
50.3*** 
(7.1) 
   σc=250 exp. 
 
63.7*** 
(14.1) 
58.7*** 
(15.0) 
 
57.8*** 
(13.0) 
56.6*** 
(12.2) 
   σc=350 exp. 50.4*** 
(22.8) 
44.9* 
(10.2) 
34.1***,+++ 
(22.5) 
43.5 
(13.4) 
     
High Cost Effort     
    All experiments 
 
39.3*** 
(21.7) 
35.2*** 
(17.5) 
 
29.1 
(20.1) 
32.7*** 
(15.5) 
   σc=150 exp. 
          
         % of  e= 0  
         outcomes 
31.5 
(16.7) 
10% 
28.2 
(17.0) 
20% 
28.7 
(18.8) 
14% 
32.8*** 
(13.2) 
2% 
   σc=250 exp. 
 
          % of  e= 0 
         outcomes 
50*** 
(16.6) 
0% 
38.5*** 
(16.1) 
6.7% 
34.6 
(20.8) 
24% 
31.4*** 
(14.7) 
8% 
   σc=350 exp. 
 
          % of  e= 0 
         outcomes 
36.2 
(26.2) 
23% 
38.8*** 
(17.4) 
8.3% 
24*, +++ 
(19.5) 
22% 
34.3** 
(19.1) 
10% 
Note 1: The means were calculated across players and rounds. 
Note 2: *,**,*** signifies that effort levels are significantly different from predicted effort levels at the 10% , 5% 
and 1% levels of significance, respectively, using the Wilcoxon Sign-Rank test. 
Note 3: +,++,+++ signifies that effort levels are significantly different from the predicted disequilibrium effort levels at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively, using the Wilcoxon Sign-Rank test. 
Note 4: Bold numbers indicate that pre- and post-auction results (for same contract type) are significantly different 
at at least the 5% level using a Mann-Whitney test.
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Tournament Results - Common Shock=150/250
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Figure 1.  Effort across rounds for the 2Cσ =150 and 250 experiments. 
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Tournament Results - Common Shock=350
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Figure 2. Effort across rounds for the Cσ =350 experiments 
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Absolute Performance Results
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Figure 3. Effort across rounds for all absolute performance experiments. 
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Tournament Results - 150/250 vs 350 (post-auction 
only)
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Figure 4. Across round effort comparison between 2Cσ =150/250 and 2Cσ =350 tournament 
experiments. 
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Table 3. Effort Regressions (Effort is Dependent Variable) 
 Random Effects Estimates 
Data (1) 
Tournament Data only 
(2) 
Absolute Performance Data 
only 
Constant 
 
45.25*** 
(3.79) 
47.47*** 
(2.74) 
Dummy for Experiment 3 σc=350  
 
 
-12.61* 
(7.64) 
-2.97 
(6.57) 
Round trend 
 
-0.65*** 
(0.25) 
-0.86*** 
(0.18) 
   
No. of Observations (post auction data 
only) 
300 300 
Note 1. *,**,*** signifies that coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10% , 5% and 1% levels. 
Note 2. Robust standard errors are contained in the parentheses below the coefficients and were calculated using the 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance estimator (White 1980). 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics for Agents’ Per-Round Earnings – Means (Standard 
Deviations) 
 Post-Auction Data 
 Tournament Absolute Performance 
Pooled Earnings   
    All experiments 
 
$0.42 
($0.29) 
$0.44 
($0.25) 
   σc=150 exp. 
 
$0.44 
($0.32) 
$0.47 
($0.24) 
   σc=250 exp. 
 
$0.34*** 
($0.28) 
$0.49*** 
($0.24) 
   σc=350 exp. $0.47*** 
($0.26) 
$0.35*** 
($0.24) 
   
Low Cost Earnings   
    All experiments 
 
$0.54*** 
($0.25) 
$0.46*** 
($0.24) 
   σc=150 exp. 
 
$0.61** 
($0.28) 
$0.52** 
($0.24) 
   σc=250 exp. 
 
$0.45 
($0.24) 
$0.52 
($0.21) 
   σc=350 exp. $0.57*** 
($0.21) 
$0.37*** 
($0.25) 
   
High Cost 
Earnings 
  
    All experiments 
 
$0.29*** 
($0.28) 
$0.41*** 
($0.25) 
   σc=150 exp. 
 
$0.27*** 
($0.27) 
$0.42*** 
($0.23) 
   σc=250 exp. 
 
$0.24*** 
($0.29) 
$0.47*** 
($0.25) 
   σc=350 exp. $0.37 
($0.26) 
$0.31 
($0.23) 
Note 1: The means were calculated across players and rounds. 
Note 2: *,**,*** signifies that effort levels are significantly different across tournaments and 
absolute performance contracts at the 10% , 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively using 
a Mann-Whitney test. 
 41 
Table 5. Random Effects Estimates for Earnings (Post-Auction Data) 
 Dependent Variable 
Variables (1) 
Earnings Deviation 
(2) 
Earnings 
Constant 
 
0.26*** 
(0.06) 
0.63*** 
(0.10) 
Tournament dummy (1 if obs. from a tournament 
session, 0 otherwise) 
 
0.17*** 
(0.05) 
-0.43*** 
(0.11) 
Common Shock STD  ( Cσ ) 
 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.02*** 
(0.006) 
Lowcost dummy (1 if obs. from a low cost subject) 
 
-- 0.07* 
(0.035) 
Tournament × Cσ  
 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.02*** 
(0.007) 
Tournament × Lowcost 
 
-- 0.19*** 
(0.04) 
Round Trend 
 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.007** 
(0.0035) 
Estimated sum of coefficients for Tournament and 
Tournament x Cσ  
 
0.16*** 
(0.05) 
 
-- 
Estimated sum of coefficients for Cσ  and 
Tournament x Cσ  
 
-0.01** 
(0.004) 
-- 
Estimated sum of the coefficients for Lowcost  and 
Lowcost × Tournamment 
 
-- 0.26*** 
 (0.04) 
Chi-Sq(2) statistic for the joint significance of 
Tournament and Tournament x Cσ  
 
29.58*** -- 
Chi-Sq(2) statistic for the joint significance of the  
 Cσ  and Tournament× Cσ  
 
8.40** -- 
Chi-Sq(2) statistic for the joint significance of the  
Lowcost and Lowcost × Tournament variables 
-- 48.17*** 
No. of Observations 600 600 
Note 1. *,**,*** signifies that coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10% , 5% and 1% levels. 
Note 2. Standard errors are contained in the parentheses below the coefficients and were calculated using the White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance estimator (White 1980) 
Note 3. The dependent variables are measured in dollars.   
Note 4. Chi-square statistics were reported for the joint tests instead of F-statistics because all that is known about 
the random-effects estimator is its asymptotic properties.  Our regressions were estimated using STATA which 
reports Chi-square statistics for random effects regressions.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Example of Instructions for the Tournament (“Experiment A”) 
 
Introduction 
 
This is an experiment about decision making.  The instructions are simple, and if you follow 
them carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable amount of money, which 
will be paid in cash to you at the end of today’s session. 
 
Specific Instructions 
 
As you read these instructions you will be in a room with a number of other subjects.  One of 
these subjects has been chosen to be paired with you by a random drawing of subject numbers 
conducted before you arrived.  This subject will be called your pair member.  The identity of 
your pair member will never be revealed to you and your pair member will never know your 
identity. 
 
In the experiment you will perform a simple task.  In each round of the experimental game you 
will choose a number between 0 and 100 – this is called your ‘Decision Number’.  Associated 
with each Decision Number is decision cost, which is listed in Column B of Table 1.  Note that 
the higher the Decision Number you choose, the higher is the associated decision cost.  Also, for 
each decision number, costs are lower in Table 1A and higher in Table 1B.  Whether you have 
been assigned Table 1A or Table 1B depends on the seat you were assigned.  Those that arrived 
early were randomly assigned to either seat 1, 3, 9, or 2, 4, 10 and will have Table 1A.  If you are 
in seats 5, 7, 11, or 6, 8, 12 you will have Table 1B.  If you have Table 1A, then your pair 
member will have Table 1B and vice versa.  
 
At the beginning of each round of the experimental game you and your pair member will each 
select a Decision Number separately.  Write your number in Column 1 of Sheet 1.  Also, record 
the decision cost associated with your decision number in Column 6 of Sheet 1. 
 
When all subjects have selected their decision numbers, an experimenter will have one subject 
choose a penny from a bucket with a large number of pennies in it.  Each penny in the bucket has 
a number written on it and the set of all possible numbers range from –35 to + 35.  The sheet 
“Distribution of the Random Number Draw” contains the frequency (number of pennies for each 
specific number).  You will note that more pennies feature numbers closer to zero and the fewer 
pennies feature numbers close to –35 and +35.  In other words, there is a higher probability of 
drawing numbers closer to zero than numbers far from zero.  The penny chosen will be called the 
‘Group Random Draw Number’.  Everyone in the room will enter this number in Column 2. 
 
Then the experimenters will bring buckets around to each of you.  You will draw a penny from 
the bucket and the number on this penny will be called your ‘Individual Random Draw Number’.  
Record your Individual Random Draw Number in column 3 of Sheet 1 and then return the penny 
to the bucket.  
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Calculation of Payments  
 
The amount of money you earn in each round will be determined as follows.  You will add your 
Decision Number (column 1) to the Group Random Draw Number (column 2) and to your 
Individual Random Draw Number (column 3)  – write this total in Column 4 of Sheet 1.  Your 
pair member will do the same.  The experimenter will also record this information after you 
receive your Individual Random Draw Number. 
 
Since all subjects have worked in privacy, the experimenter will then compare the totals of you 
and your pair member.  If your total in Column 4 is greater than your pair member, you receive 
the high payment of $0.95; if your point total is smaller than your pair member, you receive the 
low payment of $0.33.  Whether you receive $0.95 or $0.33 depends only on whether your point 
total is greater than or less than the point total of your pair member.  It does not depend on how 
much bigger or smaller it is.  If there is a tie in total points, the Table 1B pair member gets the 
high payment. 
 
The experimenter will announce whether you have received a high or low payment.  Circle the 
appropriate payment in Column 5 and subtract the decision cost associated with your decision 
number, which is in Column 6.  Record this difference in Column 7.  The amount in Column 7 is 
your earnings in dollars for the round unless this is a practice round.  If this is a paying round, 
this amount will be added to your running total, which is tabulated in Column 8.  Your running 
total at the end of the 10th paying round is then carried forward to the next experiment. 
 
Before we get started, make sure that you write your chair number on “Sheet 1”.   
 
You may also take a minute to look at your  pair member’s decision cost sheet.  Once you 
have looked at it, please pass it to one of the experimenters and work strictly off of your 
own decision cost sheet.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example of Absolute Performance Contract Instructions (“Experiment B”) 
This experiment is identical to Experiment A in all aspects except the following. 
 
Review of Instructions 
1. Beginning of Round Announced 
2. Choose Decision Number    Record in Column 1 
3. Locate associated Decision Cost from Table 1   Record in Column 6 
4. One Subject Draws Group Random Number  Record in Column 2 
5. Each subject draw Individual Random Number  Record in Column 3 
6. Add Numbers in Columns 1, 2 and 3  Record in Column 4 
7. If your sum is:  
a. Higher than your ‘pair member’  Circle $0.95 as your payment 
b. Lower tha  your ‘pair me ber’  Circle $0.33 as your payment 
8. Subtract your ‘Decision Cost’ from your payment  Record in Column 7 
9. If this is a paying round then  Update running total (Col. 8) 
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Example of Instructions for the Absolute Performance Contract (“Experiment B”) 
 
In Experiment A you received the high payment if the sum of your Decision Number, the Group 
Random Draw Number and your Individual Random Draw Number was greater than your pair 
member’s sum.  If your sum was lower than your pair member, you would receive the low 
payment. 
 
In this Experiment, you will receive a high payment of $0.95 if the sum of your Decision 
Number, the Group Random Draw Number and your Individual Random Draw Number is 
greater than or equal to 41.  If this sum is less than 41, you will receive a low payment of $0.40.  
Whether you receive $0.95 or $0.40 as your payment depends only on whether your point total is 
greater than or equal to 41 – it does not depend on how much bigger or smaller. 
 
All instructions for recording your Decision Number, Decision Cost, Group Random Number, 
Individual Random Number and payment amount and all instructions for calculating your per 
round earnings are the same as before.   
 
You will resume tabulating your running total after the one practice round.  Please remember to 
carry forward your net running total from the bottom of Sheet 1 to the top of Column 7 on Sheet 
2 so that you can correctly tabulate your running total for this experiment.  That is, your running 
total builds upon your net earnings from the previous experiment and will be carried forward to 
the next experiment. 
 
Are there any questions? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Review of Instructions 
10. Beginning of Round Announced 
11. Choose Decision Number    Record in Column 1 
12. Locate associated Decision Cost from Table 1   Record in Column 6 
13. One subject draws Group Random Number  Record in Column 2 
14. Each subject draw Individual Random Number  Record in Column 3 
15. Add numbers in Columns 1, 2 and 3  Record in Column 4 
16. If your sum is:  
a. Greater than or equal to 41  Circle $0.95 as your payment 
b. Less than 41  Circle $0.40 as your payment 
17. Subtract your ‘Decision Cost’ from your payment  Record in Column 7 
18. If this is a paying round then  Update running total (Col. 8) 
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Table 1A.  Decision Numbers and Associated Point Deductions (Seats 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10) 
Column A: 
Decision 
Number 
Column B: 
Decision Cost  
Column A: 
Decision 
Number 
Column B: 
Decision Cost  
Column A: 
Decision 
Number 
Column B: 
Decision Cost  
Column A: 
Decision 
Number 
Column B: 
Decision Cost 
0 0.0000  25 0.0625  50 0.2500  75 0.5625 
1 0.0001  26 0.0676  51 0.2601  76 0.5776 
2 0.0004  27 0.0729  52 0.2704  77 0.5929 
3 0.0009  28 0.0784  53 0.2809  78 0.6084 
4 0.0016  29 0.0841  54 0.2916  79 0.6241 
5 0.0025  30 0.0900  55 0.3025  80 0.6400 
6 0.0036  31 0.0961  56 0.3136  81 0.6561 
7 0.0049  32 0.1024  57 0.3249  82 0.6724 
8 0.0064  33 0.1089  58 0.3364  83 0.6889 
9 0.0081  34 0.1156  59 0.3481  84 0.7056 
10 0.0100  35 0.1225  60 0.3600  85 0.7225 
11 0.0121  36 0.1296  61 0.3721  86 0.7396 
12 0.0144  37 0.1369  62 0.3844  87 0.7569 
13 0.0169  38 0.1444  63 0.3969  88 0.7744 
14 0.0196  39 0.1521  64 0.4096  89 0.7921 
15 0.0225  40 0.1600  65 0.4225  90 0.8100 
16 0.0256  41 0.1681  66 0.4356  91 0.8281 
17 0.0289  42 0.1764  67 0.4489  92 0.8464 
18 0.0324  43 0.1849  68 0.4624  93 0.8649 
19 0.0361  44 0.1936  69 0.4761  94 0.8836 
20 0.0400  45 0.2025  70 0.4900  95 0.9025 
21 0.0441  46 0.2116  71 0.5041  96 0.9216 
22 0.0484  47 0.2209  72 0.5184  97 0.9409 
23 0.0529  48 0.2304  73 0.5329  98 0.9604 
24 0.0576  49 0.2401  74 0.5476  99 0.9801 
         100 1.0000 
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Table 1B.  Decision Numbers and Associated Point Deductions (5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12) 
Column A: 
Decision 
Number 
Column B: 
Decision Cost  
Column A: 
Decision 
Number 
Column B: 
Decision Cost  
Column A: 
Decision 
Number 
Column B: 
Decision Cost  
Column A: 
Decision 
Number 
Column B: 
Decision Cost 
0 0.00000  25 0.09375  50 0.37500  75 0.84375 
1 0.00015  26 0.10140  51 0.39015  76 0.86640 
2 0.00060  27 0.10935  52 0.40560  77 0.88935 
3 0.00135  28 0.11760  53 0.42135  78 0.91260 
4 0.00240  29 0.12615  54 0.43740  79 0.93615 
5 0.00375  30 0.13500  55 0.45375  80 0.96000 
6 0.00540  31 0.14415  56 0.47040  81 0.98415 
7 0.00735  32 0.15360  57 0.48735  82 1.00860 
8 0.00960  33 0.16335  58 0.50460  83 1.03335 
9 0.01215  34 0.17340  59 0.52215  84 1.05840 
10 0.01500  35 0.18375  60 0.54000  85 1.08375 
11 0.01815  36 0.19440  61 0.55815  86 1.10940 
12 0.02160  37 0.20535  62 0.57660  87 1.13535 
13 0.02535  38 0.21660  63 0.59535  88 1.16160 
14 0.02940  39 0.22815  64 0.61440  89 1.18815 
15 0.03375  40 0.24000  65 0.63375  90 1.21500 
16 0.03840  41 0.25215  66 0.65340  91 1.24215 
17 0.04335  42 0.26460  67 0.67335  92 1.26960 
18 0.04860  43 0.27735  68 0.69360  93 1.29735 
19 0.05415  44 0.29040  69 0.71415  94 1.32540 
20 0.06000  45 0.30375  70 0.73500  95 1.35375 
21 0.06615  46 0.31740  71 0.75615  96 1.38240 
22 0.07260  47 0.33135  72 0.77760  97 1.41135 
23 0.07935  48 0.34560  73 0.79935  98 1.44060 
24 0.08640  49 0.36015  74 0.82140  99 1.47015 
         100 1.50000 
 
 
